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The Budget Period and State Trends
A budget period of one year has long been the norm in public finance.
In fact, researchers seeking to explain the budgetary principle of annuality have often stressed custom and tradition, not fiscal theory. Renee Stourm's landmark work, for example, emphasizes that "this period corresponds with the customary measure of human estimates" (Stourm 1917, 319 ; see also Sundelson 1935) .
There is no doubt that the year has deep roots in the history of human calculation. But the practice of annual budgeting also has longstanding fiscal significance because it measures a cycle of fundamental importance to agriculturally-oriented communities (Buck 1934, 127-130) .
Planning according to this natural cycle was crucial in pre-industrial societies and remains essential in the rural communities of today.
In England, adoption of annuality as a public budgeting principle can also be explained partly by the historical development of parliamentary authority. Since involvement in state finance has always been the source of their power, members of Parliament chose to take up the Crown's tax and spending proposals each year not only to permit frequent review of the monarch's fiscal activities but also to ensure that their grievances would be heard regularly.
Seen from the perspective of a young Parliament engaged in an ongoing struggle with its king, one can easily appreciate the desire for a budget period of no longer than a year (Maitland 1920, 444; Ogg 1944; Punnett 1968, 280-282) .
The federal government of the United States has always adhered to the norm of annuality with respect to the budget period.2 In fact, annual fiscal statements were issued even before the nation's budgetary system was formalized by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The original thirteen states also employed this principle. Nearly all the states convened their legislatures annually and practiced annual budgeting prior to 1840.
In the 184Os, however, states began to harness their legislatures by moving to biennial sessions and budgets. Historical research identifies six reasons for this development.
One is the rise of a belief that state assemblies needed less time to meet due to increased popular participation in public decision making. In particular, citizens had increasingly been given the right to elect public officials who were previously appointed, and to alter state policies through constitutional conventions and referenda.3
The nineteenth-century trend toward biennial state action was also due to declining public confidence in the legislative branch. Like the federal government of our era, assemblies were often criticized for passing too many laws that conferred benefits upon special interests.
Other arguments for the move to constrain state legislatures included the following: government costs would be reduced since most legislators were paid on a per diem and mileage basis; assemblies would be encouraged to increase the pace of their work (as a further inducement, many states placed restrictions on the length of legislative sessions);
and biennial sessions would yield not only more regular attendance but also less frequent changes in state laws. Just four state legislatures --New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, and Rhode Island --were meeting annually by 1940.
The century-long trend toward biennial budgeting came to an end after World War II. Many state assemblies returned to annual sessions and budgets in response to increasing demands for public programs and
facilities. An added incentive in the 1960s and 1970s was that annuality enabled more rapid adjustment to changes in federal policies and expenditures, especially in the realm of grants to states (Meyers 1988, 23 Table 1 ).
Proposals and Arguments
The first federal bill to propose a biennial budget and The budget schedule contained in Panetta's bill began with the President's submission of both a current services budget and a biennial budget at the start of each two-year congressional term (the oddnumbered year). The first six months of that year would be devoted to formal oversight of programs and agencies by the committees of each house. During the second six months, budget committees would report the first budget resolution and legislative committees would report all authorizing legislation.
In the second year, Congress would first act on authorizing bills and then pass both budget resolutions and appropriations legislation; the biennium would begin October 1 of each even-numbered year (Panetta 1977 Hamilton (D-Indiana) and Ralph Regula (R-Ohio).
Although a rash of missed budget deadlines helped generate interest in biennial budgeting during the 198Os, proponents of this reform often stress that budgeting will remain difficult.
Budgetary decisions are political decisions --they cannot be made easier by procedural revision. The case for two-year budgeting does not involve the promise of bipartisan fiscal harmony and timely budget agreements (Meyers 1988, 26) .5 The case centers instead on the belief that a biennial budget and appropriations cycle will streamline the budget process; make federal policies more effective; and promote economic stability.6 (CSG 1972, 20-21) .
Streamlining the Budget Process
In contrast, states moving to from biennial to annual budgeting provided evidence of an increased budget workload --especially in executive agencies. Numerous respondents from these states indicated that annual budgeting allowed less time for consideration of substantive issues, provision of management services, and research into the improvement of agency structures and program operations (CSG 1972, 4-5) .
Officials from Wisconsin, meanwhile, reported that although the addition of a thorough off-year review to their two-year budget system had some adverse effect on policy development and administration, budgeting in the second year was still only one-third as time consuming as full budget preparation (CSG 1972, 21-22) .
A 1984 study conducted for the Texas House of Representatives by the Public Policy Resources Laboratory of Texas A&M University contains two sections relevant to the current discussion (Wiggins and Hamm 1984) .
One section is the product of field interviews with public officials and observers in five states that shifted from biennial to annual budgeting between the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Texas A&M interviewers found that state agencies experienced increased budget-preparation workloads and costs, though estimates of these costs were not provided and their magnitude was said to vary from state to state. The researchers also reported that although annual budgeting caused legislators to devote greater time to budget issues, interviewees stressed that this additional time sometimes came at the expense of program reviews and was not necessarily used to produced better budgets.
The researchers illustrate this perspective by quoting one legislator who recommended a return to biennial budgeting so lawmakers would be better able l'to consider the budget deliberatively" ( Both analyses were conducted to help shed light on issues raised during congressional consideration of federal biennial-budgeting proposals.
The GAO's case-oriented study found that a principal benefit of biennial budgeting is that it allows executive and legislative officials more time for management, oversight and other activities beyond budget preparation and approval (Bowsher 1984 ; see also Myers 1982) . annual budgets, it concludes ultimately that no strong pattern emerges on this matter (Kirkman 1987, 19 and 25) . The same conclusion is drawn by authors of the 1984 Texas A&M report and by a 1994 study by Ronald K.
Snell of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). In fact,
Snell notes that supplementals have been used just as often in states with annual and biennial budgets in recent years (Wiggins and Hamm 1984, section III, 14; Snell 1994, 8 ; and see also the discussion of action taken to close state budget gaps in Posner 1993, 25-35) .
The final issue to be considered before turning to findings from the new budgeting survey produced by the state of New Jersey is the suggestion that federal budget work will expand to fill the time available. States do not stretch budget action over a two-year period.
Instead, they employ a split-session model that confines such action to a single year (Kirkman 1987, 26-28) . with a two-year rather than a one-year budget period range from a few thousand dollars to the suggestion of two respondents that the former system cuts budget costs in half. Responses make it clear that cost estimates depend heavily on auxiliary assumptions such as whether budget agency staff would be augmented or merely reassigned to accommodate a shift from biennial to annual budgeting (NJOMB 1995, 14-15) . This suggests that future research into the costs of biennial versus annual budgeting should be as precise as possible about the nature of the comparison being investigated.
The New Jersey Study
Another question in the New Jersey study asks whether mid-term budget adjustments are as time consuming as preparation of a separate budget. Respondents are unanimous in their view that making adjustments during the two-year fiscal period requires less work than annual budgeting. Indeed, some note that the time saving is significant.
Maine's budget office provides the most concrete estimate --it reports that adjustments require between one-third and one-half the time necessary for preparation of the initial budget. Only one respondent (from Wisconsin) indicates that a revision can sometimes require an effort approaching that of annual budgeting (NJOMB 1995, 8-g ).'
Discussion
The biennial-budgeting survey conducted by the NJOMB combines with previous state studies to support the argument that biennial budgeting --at least in its split-sessions form --streamlines the budget process.
This experience suggests that a two-year federal budget period (with split sessions) would eliminate much procedural repetition and enable executive agencies and Congress to devote more time to pursuits beyond developing and defending budgets. It also suggests that biennial budgeting would lessen somewhat the feeling among members of Congress that many budget decisions are made in haste and without adequate consideration given to their consequences.1o
The need for budget adjustments might increase somewhat under a two-year budget and appropriations cycle. But state experience
indicates that biennial budgeting is still less time consuming than annual budgeting. Moreover, some budget shortfalls that would cause states to act (due to balanced-budget requirements) might be accepted more readily by the federal government --for even in the present antideficit era, many member of Congress still accept the notion that the national government should run at least a modest deficit during cyclical downturns (Mongia 1995, 31-32) . This fact, combined with Snell's recent finding (mentioned above) that supplementals are not more common in biennial-budgeting states, weakens considerably the proposition that biennial budgeting will become overwhelmed by fiscal revisions.
The direct savings to be gained by adopting biennial budgeting at the federal level are not likely not translate into millions of dollars.
Most legislative and agency employees affected by budget-work reductions would probably be reassigned, not dismissed. But if these workers' energies were directed toward matters such as oversight and the improvement of service delivery, substantial indirect savings could be realized as a consequence of making federal policies more effective.
Making Policies More Effective
While the overall federal budget operates on an annual basis, experiments conducted by a small number of agencies and congressional committees have put some budget elements on a two-year schedule during the past decade. In the late-1980s, for example, members of the Senate broke with tradition and authorized funds for a biennial period for both the Justice Department and intelligence spending. Senators explained that the actions were taken to encourage greater executive-branch planning and to allow Congress additional time for non-budget issues, including the opportunity to conduct more thorough program reviews (Congressional quarterly almanac 1987, 283 and 1989, 546) .
The only academic work to evaluate a federal experiment with biennial budgeting is one by Robert J. Art (1989) (Art 1989, 208) .
Since Congress refused to authorize and appropriate funds for a two-year period, agency stability was not enhanced. Nevertheless, Pentagon comptrollers and service programmers were unanimous in the belief that biennial budget preparation was beneficial. Art reports that the two-year schedule reduced problems associated with the overlapping of budget cycles and enabled the introduction of analyses, evaluations and plans that were widely viewed as having improved agency operations. He writes: biennial budgeting allowed DOD officials time "to do things they should have been doing but never could do because of the ratrace of annual budgeting" (Art 1989, 206 ).
Art indicates that although specifying dollar amounts is difficult, gains associated with better evaluation and planning are not trivial.
Biennial budgeting's procurement savings, however, are much more easily calculated --and Art suggests that per-unit savings here could be 50 percent or more for some weapons. In his view, better quality decisions and more efficient resource utilization are the ultimate benefits of biennial budgeting (Art 1989, 208-213) .
State Studies
Among studies of state experience, New Jersey's survey seeks to most directly explore the question of whether biennial budgeting makes policies more effective. In particular, it asks if biennial budgeting improves program performance and planning. Eight budget officers respond in the affirmative, while two indicate only that two-year budgeting "should" engender such improvements (one wrote "we have no way of proving this assumption"). The remaining response is as follows: " I have no data on its impact on planning and performance" (NJOMB 1995, 15-16 A two-year process enables officials in both the executive and legislative branches to devote more time and resources to the goal of making policies more effective. In addition, it alleviates problems caused by the current need to prepare a budget without knowledge of action on a previous one. It may also reduce the benefits that special interests gain from the hurried nature of the present process.11
In recent years, many economic-policy analysts have emphasized the need for the nation's lawmakers to achieve not only long-term deficit reduction but also a fiscal orientation that places greater emphasis on public investment (see, for example, GAO 1992; and Sichel 1995) .
Biennial budgeting can contribute to the goal of reducing the federal budget deficit by providing legislators with an opportunity not only to
give closer scrutiny to entitlements and other forms of "mandatory" federal spending but also to make a wide range of policies more effective-l2 Two-year budgeting also enables Congress to change fiscal priorities gradually --multi-year plans can be more easily set and met when budgets are enacted biennially.
Promoting Economic Stability
Supporters of biennial federal budgeting suggest that two-year budgets can promote stability at not only the macroeconomic level but also at the level of specific individuals, agencies and corporations.
Opponents respond that stability comes only at the expense of two important features of the present system: flexibility and congressional control (over the budget and the executive branch). The fact that economic priorities and policies may be maintained for two years at a time leads some to argue that a biennial system will be insufficiently responsive to both changing circumstances and the public interest.
State Studies
According to the GAO's 1984 biennial-budgeting report, officials in states with two-year budgeting expressed the belief that the system's benefits outweighed its problems. At the same time, they identified the following as disadvantages:
--the increased difficulty in estimating accurately revenues and expenditures in the second year and budgeting for l'uncontrollablell items, such as changes in expenditures for entitlement programs; and 
1984, 2-3).
This provides some evidence supporting the view that biennial budgeting requires some loss of both flexibility and legislative control.
The NJOMB study reinforces the view that forecasting accuracy and fiscal flexibility are greater under annual budgeting (there is no discussion of legislative control).13 But it also indicates --as discussed earlier --that biennial budgets are less time consuming and less costly to prepare, even after accounting for mid-term corrections.
The principal budget complications identified by states are the following: economic fluctuations; unstable federal funding; and unanticipated Medicaid expenses (NJOMB 1995, 2-12) .
The New Jersey survey also asks whether biennial budgeting provides greater certainty for managers of public programs, schools, and local units of government that depend on state funding. All respondents indicate that two-year budgets increase stability and certainty, though some note that major changes in the economic and/or political climate can nullify the potential gains of a biennial system (NJOMB 1995, 15-16) . These findings confirm a view expressed by Snell in his 1994 NCSL report (Snell 1994, 6-7 The approach to macroeconomic stabilization that has just been described would require Congress to accept increased uncertainty about the specific dollar amount of a given year's budget deficit. While the nation's tax and expenditure programs can be structured so that the deficit's size falls within a rather narrow range, biennial budgeting might make it more difficult to hit a particular target figure during a period of economic instability. But this is not a new problem; legislators have always had to decide between balancing the overall economy and balancing the budget with precision. Macroeconomic stabilization does not mean that Congress has given up V'control," merely that it has chosen to control the economy with greater precision than the annual budget deficit.l'
An examination of state experience with biennial budgeting permits three additional comments on congressional control. One is that Congress's control over the budget may be enhanced by biennial budgeting because the process gives legislators an increased opportunity to review existing policies and expenditures. Another is that Congress can retain some control over apportionment of funds across the biennium by enacting two one-year appropriations (rather than a consolidated two-year budget)
at the start of each budget period. According to Snell, 17 of the 20 biennial-budgeting states allocate appropriations in this manner (Snell 1994, 3) .19 A third observation is that although some suggest biennial budgeting might cause Congress write even more l'micro-management" provisions into law, evidence from the Texas A&M study contradicts that suggestion (Meyers 1988, 29; Wiggins and Hamm 1984, section III, 27) .
In short, executive-legislative relations should not be altered significantly by biennial federal budgeting.
(For a similar view, see Mann (1993) .)
While it is questionable that biennial budgets will reduce congressional control, one cannot deny that some tradeoff exists between the flexibility of annual budgeting and the stability --and increased opportunity for policy analysis and planning --of two-year budgeting.
Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons for choosing the more stable budget process over the more flexible annual system. Finally, scholarly articles by Rivlin and reports by the GAO both indicate that the current federal budgeting system is one that permits too much flexibility and suffers from too little stability, continuity and policy planning (Rivlin 1981 and GAO 1989 and 1992) .20 AS U.S.
Comptroller General Charles Bowsher stated during one congressional hearing, flexibility in the current process comes "at a high price." In particular, his testimony identified a number of features that keep the process flexible and noted that such arrangements "invite revisitings of the issues and make the budget process vulnerable to extraneous and time-consuming delays." Bowsher concluded that this flexibility "gives members of Congress the feeling that the budget process is out of control and never-ending," and he encouraged lawmakers to experiment with two-year budgets (Bowsher 1988) .
Conclusion
This article demonstrates that fiscal theory does not identify one budget period as universally appropriate. Annual budgeting is not inherently llsuperiortl to multi-year budgeting. An appropriate budget period can be identified only after one weighs the advantages and disadvantages of alternate arrangements.
The evidence reviewed in this article suggests that biennial budgeting can indeed offer significant benefits if adopted at the federal level. Although use of supplementals and other budget adjustments might increase somewhat, biennial budgeting should streamline the budget process in a way that reduces overall budget work and allows more time for management, oversight, and consideration of the long-term consequences of fiscal decisions. Moreover, by taking advantage of the opportunity to focus more attention on non-budget matters, agencies and Congress can improve the effectiveness of federal policies. While direct savings from budget streamlining might be small, indirect savings resulting from efforts to make policies more effective could be substantial.
Biennial budgeting also promotes economic and social stability.
While this stability requires little reduction in congressional control, flexibility will indeed be reduced under a two-year budget system.
However, this author sides with Rivlin and others who argue that the benefits of increased stability would outweigh the small degree of flexibility lost.21
State experience suggests that biennial federal budgeting should involve not only split sessions but also separate appropriations for each year of the biennium. The former would allow each new Congress to enact a budget during its first session.22
The latter would help lawmakers retain some control over apportionment of funds.
Biennial budgeting does not make budgeting less difficult. Even under a biennial system, budgeting remains at the heart of the political process. Indeed, budgets are inherently both a product and source of political conflict. Moreover, much more than the budget period determines the effectiveness of budgeting --relevant factors range from the legislature's committee structure to the degree to which participants in the process are committed to following established procedures.23
There are a number of areas where federal policymakers might benefit from additional research on biennial state budgeting. The impact of biennial budgeting on budget preparation, for example, could use more investigation; this work might include an attempt to estimate the dollar savings associated with biennial versus annual budgets.
There has also been little exploration of the nature and use of nonbudget year fiscal reviews and adjustment mechanisms. Congress would be acting carelessly if it adopted biennial budgeting without first studying and considering the federal applicability of state review and adjustment procedures --including any that might be used to constrain supplementals.24
There has also been little research into the particular practices employed by biennial-budgeting states in their effort to improve policy development and service delivery. Perhaps this work would be best undertaken in the form of case research. Connecticut and Nebraska should be given special attention due to their rather recent shift to a two-year fiscal period.
The types of research just mentioned could be especially useful in the present political climate --one that appears highly conducive to procedural change and institutional reform. Perhaps Vice-President Gore's NPR report was not too far from the mark when it suggested that "the time is ripe" for biennial budgeting (Gore 1993, 17 2. Despite a system of annual appropriations, entitlements and other forms of "mandatory1 spending account for about two-thirds of presentday federal budgets (Schick 1995, 130-132) .
4.
The dominant biennial-budgeting models are discussed in Kirkman (1989). Kirkman's report also discusses a lWsummitV' proposal fashioned after a 1987 executive-legislative branch agreement that set two-year goals for broad categories of federal spending. That discussion illustrates the fact that "biennial budgeting" has long been a label with no set meaning. Nevertheless, the term refers most often to a system involving a two-year budget and appropriations cycle (with multiyear authorizations)
--and this more common form of "biennial budgeting" is the subject of the present article. 7. For a detailed account of federal budgeting, see (Schick 1995 (CBO 1994, 4 and 87) . The other point is that although some have suggested agencies would pad their budgets under a biennial-budget system (due to the reduced reliability of two-year projections), state experiences reviewed by the Texas A&M study do not support this contention (Wiggins and Hamm 1984, section III, 14 and section V, 6) . (This last point is also supported by the discussion of state spending found in Snell (1994, 8) ).
13.
It should be noted that one respondent to the New Jersey survey indicated biennial revenue forecasts are often more accurate than annual forecasts because short-term fluctuations tend to even themselves out over a period of two years (NJOMB 1995, 10) . This possibility was also mentioned in the GAO's 1984 study of biennial state budgeting (Bowsher 1984, 5 ).
14. Snell adds that even annual budgeting is rather predictable in stable times, because programs are seldom susceptible to sweeping changes (Snell 1994, 7 17. For an early discussion of the need for stability in fiscal policy, see Lewis H. Kimmel (1959, 279-283) .
18.
For more on the choice between balancing the economy and the deficit, see Mongia (1995) and Meyers (1988, 28-30) .
19. Under a system with two sets of one-year appropriations, Congress might choose to index certain second-year outlays to inflation.
20. According to the GAO, America's federal budget process "needs to adopt a longer-term planning horizon linking fiscal policy with broader goals for the performance of the economyI' (GAO 1992, 16) .
21. In a letter to the author dated August 2, 1993, Rivlin reiterated her support for biennial budgeting.
22. For a fuller discussion of the timing of biennial budgeting (and implications for political stability), see Bowsher (1984, 6) and Irving (1993, 6) .
Also,
note that extension of the budget period is constrained by the length of the election cycle in the House Of Representatives.
23.
For more comprehensive discussions of improving financial management within the federal government, see Bowsher (1984, 8-9) ; Gore (1993); NPR (1993); and Symposium on NPR recommendations (1995, .
24. A brief discussion of state budget review and adjustment mechanisms can be found in NJOMB (1995, (7) (8) 
